30
May

Google Font Directory

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25
Apr

Home

Behavioural Finance

Behavioural finance is the study of the influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets.
Sewell (2005)

“I think of behavioral finance as simply “open-minded finance”.”
Thaler (1993)

‘This area of enquiry is sometimes referred to as “behavioral finance,” but we call it “behavioral economics.” Behavioral economics combines the twin disciplines of psychology and economics to explain why and how people make seemimgly irrational or illogical decisions when they spend, invest, save, and borrow money.’
Belsky and Gilovich (1999)

“This paper examines the case for major changes in the behavioral assumptions underlying economic models, based on apparent anomalies in financial economics. Arguments for such changes based on claims of “excess volatility” in stock prices appear flawed for two main reasons: there are serious questions whether the phenomenon exists in the first place and, even if it did exist, whether radical change in behavioral assumptions is the best avenue for current research. The paper also examines other apparent anomalies and suggests conditions under which such behavioral changes are more or less likely to be adopted.”
Kleidon (1986)
“For most economists it is an article of faith that financial markets reach rational aggregate outcomes, despite the irrational behavior of some participants, since sophisticated players stande ready to capitalize on the mistakes of the naive. (This process, which we camm poaching, includes but is not limited to arbitrage.) Yet financial markets have been subject to speculative fads, from Dutch tulip mania to junk bonds, and to occasional dramatic losses in value, such as occurred in October 1987, that are hard to interpret as rational. Descriptive decision theory, especially psychology (see D. Kahneman et al., 1982), can help to explain such aberrant macrophenomena. Here we propose some behavioral explanations of overall market outcomes—specifically of financial flows, that are of considerable practical consequence to both policymakers and finance practitioners.
Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1991)

“Because psychology systematically explores human judgment, behavior, and well-being, it can teach us important facts about how humans differ from traditional economic assumptions. In this essay I discuss a selection of psychological findings relevant to economics. Standard economics assumes that each person has stable, well-defined preferences, and that she rationally maximizes those preferences. Section 2 considers what psychological research teaches us about the true form of preferences, allowing us to make economics more realistic within the rationalchoice framework. Section 3 reviews research on biases in judgment under uncertainty; because those biases lead people to make systematic errors in their attempts to maximize their preferences, this research poses a more radical challenge to the economics model. The array of psychological findings reviewed in Section 4 points to an even more radical critique of the economics model: Even if we are willing to modify our familiar assumptions about preferences, or allow that people make systematic errors in their attempts to maximize those preferences, it is sometimes misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to maximize well-defined, coherent, or stable preferences.”
Rabin (1996)
“Market effciency survives the challenge from the literature on long-term return anomalies. Consistent with the market effciency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction to information is about as common as underreaction, and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Most important, consistent with the market effciency prediction that apparent anomalies can be due to methodology, most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique.”
Fama (1998)

“Recent literature in empirical finance is surveyed in its relation to underlying behavioral principles, principles which come primarily from psychology, sociology and anthropology. The behavioral principles discussed are: prospect theory, regret and cognitive dissonance, anchoring, mental compartments, overconfidence, over- and underreaction, representativeness heuristic, the disjunction effect, gambling behavior and speculation, perceived irrelevance of history, magical thinking, quasimagical thinking, attention anomalies, the availability heuristic, culture and social contagion, and global culture.”
Shiller (1998)

“The field of modern financial economics assumes that people behave with extreme rationality, but they do not. Furthermore, people?s deviations from rationality are often systematic. Behavioral finance relaxes the traditional assumptions of financial economics by incorporating these observable, systematic, and very human departures from rationality into standard models of financial markets. We highlight two common mistakes investors make: excessive trading and the tendency to disproportionately hold on to losing investments while selling winners. We argue that these systematic biases have their origins in human psychology. The tendency for human beings to be overconfident causes the first bias in investors, and the human desire to avoid regret prompts the second.”
Barber and Odean (1999)

“Behavioral Economics is the combination of psychology and economics that investigates what happens in markets in which some of the agents display human limitations and complications. We begin with a preliminary question about relevance. Does some combination of market forces, learning and evolution render these human qualities irrelevant? No. Because of limits of arbitrage less than perfect agents survive and influence market outcomes. We then discuss three important ways in which humans deviate from the standard economic model. Bounded rationality reflects the limited cognitive abilities that constrain human problem solving. Bounded willpower captures the fact that people sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest. Bounded self-interest incorporates the comforting fact that humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others. We then illustrate how these concepts can be applied in two settings: finance and savings. Financial markets have greater arbitrage opportunities than other markets, so behavioral factors might be thought to be less important here, but we show that even here the limits of arbitrage create anomalies that the psychology of decision making helps explain. Since saving for retirement requires both complex calculations and willpower, behavioral factors are essential elements of any complete descriptive theory.”
Mullainathan and Thaler (2000)

“Behavioral finance is a rapidly growing area that deals with the influence of psychology on the behavior of financial practitioners.”
Shefrin (2000)

“Behavioral finance is the application of psychology to financial behavior—the behavior of practitioners.”
Shefrin (2000)

“Behavioral finance is the study of how psychology affects financial decision making and financial markets.”
Shefrin (2001)

“Behavioral finance argues that some financial phenomena can plausibly be understood using models in which some agents are not fully rational. The field has two building blocks: limits to arbitrage, which argues that it can be diffcult for rational traders to undo the dislocations caused by less rational traders; and psychology, which catalogues the kinds of deviations from full rationality we might expect to see. We discuss these two topics, and then present a number of behavioral finance applications: to the aggregate stock market, to the cross-section of average returns, to individual trading behavior, and to corporate finance. We close by assessing progress in the field and speculating about its future course.”
Barberis and Thaler (2001)

“This essay provides a perspective on the trend towards integrating psychology into economics. Some topics are discussed, and arguments are provided for why movement towards greater psychological realism in economics will improve mainstream economics.”
Rabin (2001)

“The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant flux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, evaluates the a priori arguments and the capital market evidence bearing on the importance of investor psychology for security prices, and reviews recent models.”
Hirshleifer (2001)

“Behavioral finance and behavioral economics are closely related fields which apply scientific research on human and social cognitive and emotional biases to better understand economic decisions and how they affect market prices, returns and the allocation of resources.”
Wikipedia (2005)

Bibliography

Behavioral Finance.
Behavioral Finance: A Literature Review (in Chinese).
A Bibliography of Behaviourial Finance.
Active Equity Management — “Anomalies”, Behavioral Finance,
BARBER, Brad M. and Terrance ODEAN, The Courage of Misguided Convictions, Financial Analysts Journal, November/December 1999. [about 55]
BARBERIS, Nicholas and Richard THALER, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, August 2001. [about 192]
BARBERIS, Nick, B539: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, WINTER 2001. [2]
BELSKY, Gary and Thomas GILOVICH, 1999. Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes—and how to correct them : lessons from the new science of behavioral economics.
BONETTI, Shane, Topics in Finance, 2001. [about 8]
BRABAZON, Tony, Behavioural Finance: A new sunrise or a false dawn?, 2000. [4]
CAMERER, Colin F. and George LOEWENSTEIN, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, 2002. [about 16]
DIMSON, Elroy and Massoud MUSSAVIAN, Market Efficiency, The Current State of Business Disciplines, 2000. [10]
EINHORN, Hillel J. and Robin M. HOGARTH, Decision Making Under Ambiguity, Journal of Business, Volume 59, Issue 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (Oct., 1986), S225-S250. [about 89]
FAMA, Eugene F., Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 1998. [about 629]
FRANKFURTER, George M. and Elton G. McGoun, Resistance is Futile: The Assimilation of Behavioral Finance. [about 9]
FULLER, Russell J., Behavioral Finance and the Sources of Alpha, 2000, Forthcoming, Journal of Pension Plan Investing, 1998. [about 24]
HIRSHLEIFER, David, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 2001. [about 252]
HOGARTH, Robin M. and Melvin W. REDER, Editors’ Comments: Perspectives from Economics and Psychology, Journal of Business, 1986. [about 13]
JOHNSSON, Malena, Henrik LINDBLOM and Peter PLATAN, Behavioral Finance – And the Change of Investor Behavior during and After the Speculative Bubble At the End of the 1990s, 2002. [about 2]
KLEIDON, Allan W., Anomalies in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change?, Journal of Business, 1986. [about 18]
MICHAUD, Richard O., The Behavioral Finance Hoax, 2001. [about 13]
MULLAINATHAN, Sendhil, and Richard H. THALER, 2000. Behavioral Economics [less than 159]
PATEL, Jayendu, Richard ZECKHAUSER and Darryll HENDRICKS, The Rationality Struggle: Illustrations from Financial Markets, The American Economic Review, 1991. [about 27]
RABIN, Matthew, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, Forthcoming, European Economic Review, 2001. [about 130]
RABIN, Matthew, Psychology and Economics, 1996.
RABIN, Matthew, Psychology and Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 36, Issue 1 (Mar., 1998), 11-46. [about 550]
SALMON, Mark, Behavioural Finance and Market Psychology, 2001. [about 17]
SALMON, Mark, Behavioural Finance and Market Psychology, May 1, 2001. [about 17]
SCHMID, F.A., Behavioral Finance, 2002.
SHEFRIN, Hersh (Editor), Behavioral Finance , 2001.
SHEFRIN, Hersh, 2000. Beyond Greed and Fear : Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing.
SHILLER, Robert J., Human Behavior and the Efficiency of the Financial System. [about 156]
THALER, Richard H. (Editor), Advance in Behavioral Finance, 1993.
THALER, Richard H., The End of Behavioral Finance, Financial Analysts Journal, 1999. [about 60]
Undiscovered Managers, LLC, Introduction to Behavioral Finance, 1999. [about 10]
YARIV, Leeat, Mini-Course in Behavioral Economics. [1]
ZECKHAUSER, Richard, Jayendu PATEL and Darryll HENDRICKS, Nonrational Actors and Financial Market Behavior, 1991. [about 30] and Efficient Markets [2]
Links

Behavioral finance – Wikipedia
“behavioural finance” OR “behavioral finance” – Google Scholar

24
Apr

STMicroelectronics N.V. Q1 2010 Earnings Call Transcript

STMicroelectronics N.V. (STM)

Q1 2010 Earnings Call Transcript

April 23, 2010 9:00 am ET

Executives

Tait Sorensen – Director, IR

Carlo Bozotti – President and CEO

Carlo Ferro – EVP and CFO

Alain Dutheil – COO

Carmelo Papa – EVP, Industrial & Multisegment Sector

Philippe Lambinet – EVP and General Manager, Home Entertainment & Displays Group

Analysts

Gunnar Plagge – Nomura

Tristan Gerra – Robert Baird

Sandeep Deshpande – JP Morgan

Didier Scemama – RBS

Jerome Ramel – Exane BNP Paribas

Simon Schafer – Goldman Sachs

Gareth Jenkins – UBS

Glen Yeung – Citigroup

Janardan Menon – Liberum Capital

Adrien Bommelaer – Piper Jaffray

Presentation

Operator

Good morning or good afternoon. This is the Chorus Call conference operator. Welcome and thank you for joining the STMicroelectronics first quarter 2010 results conference call. As a reminder all participants are in a listen-only mode, and the conference is being recorded. After the presentation, there will be an opportunity to ask questions. (Operator instructions)

At this time, I would like to turn the

via STMicroelectronics N.V. Q1 2010 Earnings Call Transcript — Seeking Alpha.

24
Apr

Intel Achieves First LEED Gold for Design Center

Intel Corp. has earned its first LEED certification from the U.S. Green Building Council for its new design center set to open in Haifa, Israel in June. Achieving a Gold-level rating, the Intel Design Center 9 (IDC 9) also is the first building in Israel to receive this level of certification for sustainable construction.

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Intel Corp. has earned its first LEED certification from the U.S. Green Building Council for its new design center set to open in Haifa, Israel in June. Achieving a Gold-level rating, the Intel Design Center 9 (IDC 9) also is the first building in Israel to receive this level of certification for sustainable construction.

A key feature of the design center is the Intel Xeon processor-based data center that significantly reduces power consumption. It is expected to provide an annual savings of $200,000.

Other “green” building features include energy-efficiency fixtures including controlled lighting and air conditioning systems, an automatic control system that regulates the flow of natural light, a rooftop garden to improve thermal insulation and prevent the building from retaining excessive heat, and an automatic system for measuring carbon-dioxide levels in the office space for improved air quality.

The building also has a method for capturing and recycling condensate water from the air conditioning system for irrigation, and uses dissipated heat from the air conditioners and data center computers for heating.

The IDC 9 design reduces total building energy use by 17 percent compared to “ordinary” buildings, according to the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) 90.1-2007 standard.

KM 1, an Intel factory and office building in Kulim, Malaysia, achieved basic LEED certification in April for improvements made to the 14-year-old facility. LEED Gold certification is currently pending for Intel’s Ocotillo campus in Chandler, Ariz.

In addition to its sustainable building strategy, the semiconductor manufacturer is also beefing up its solar energy projects. Intel plans to install approximately 2.5 megawatts (MW) of new solar power projects at eight locations in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Oregon.

In May last year, Intel unveiled a 100-kilowatt (kW) solar installation at its Jones Farm Campus in Hillsboro, Oregon.

Intel also retained its number one spot as the EPA’s top renewable energy purchaser, with 1.433 billion kWh annually, up from 1.301 billion kWh in the October 2009 rankings. Intel uses renewable energy for 51 percent of its operations, up from 48 percent in October.

via Intel Achieves First LEED Gold for Design Center · Environmental Leader · Green Business, Sustainable Business, and Green Strategy News for Corporate Sustainability Executives.

24
Apr

The Campana Brothers, Humberto and Fernando, called their new storage unit Cabana, but it looked more Wild Thing than beach hut. Anyone who got beyond the wigged facade found the unit filled with ideas, though. How often does storage come in a shape that's not boxy? Plus the fireproofed raffia cover provided more angles of access than a conventional door. Franco Forci / The Campana Brothers, Humberto and Fernando, called their new storage unit Cabana, but it looked more Wild Thing than beach hut. Anyone who got beyond the wigged facade found the unit filled with ideas, though. How often does storage come in a shape that's not boxy? Plus the fireproofed raffia cover provided more angles of access than a conventional door.

Milan Furniture Fair

via Milan furniture fair 2010: The good, the bad and the puzzling – latimes.com.

23
Apr

Alaska Airlines knows volcanic ash. Its decades of experience navigating around volcanic eruptions in Washington and Alaska could prove useful as airlines return to Europe's ash-plagued skies.Among the lessons: Pilot training, computer modeling to accurately predict ash trajectories and regular testing of the skyways when eruptions occur are crucial to maintaining safety and keeping planes flying. The Alaska Airlines experience suggests a volcanic eruption in Iceland doesn't have to ground all flights in Northern Europe—there are ways to work around it.Planes took to the skies across much of Europe on Tuesday, five days after the volcanic eruption under the Eyjafjallajokull ay-yah-FYAH'-tlah-yer-kuh-duhl glacier in Iceland grounded thousands of flights and caused massive travel disruptions. It isn't clear whether flights could have resumed sooner. But that's mainly because government officials, weather experts and airlines didn't put their heads together to determine where the ash was, and where it wasn't.Instead, the Iceland crisis resulted in a blanket closure of a huge swath of airspace, rather than a more targeted, scientific approach in which some routes are found to be clear of ash and left open. Governments were slow to understand the world-wide impact of the shutdown and based decisions to close airspace on theoretical models with no data or tests, complained Giovanni Bisignani, director general and chief executive of the International Air Transport Association, a Geneva-based airline-industry group.Once tests were started, he said, some airspace that had been closed proved to be clean of ash. Had tests been run earlier in the crisis, large-scale flight operations could have continued, according to IATA.”Nobody called for help,” Mr. Bisignani said.European authorities say they acted cautiously out of safety concerns. “Whatever we do, our safety standards and responsibility for safety cannot be deteriorated,” Siim Kallas, the European Union Transport Commissioner, said in response to criticism from airlines. And Andrew Haines, chief executive of the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority, said the best guidance air-traffic authorities received was to avoid ash no matter what.”When you are dealing with people's lives it is not enough to say, this guidance looks a bit restrictive, let's just make up a less restrictive one. You have to agree on new safety guidelines that are evidence-based,” he said in a statement Wednesday.

via How One Airline Skirts Volcanic Ash Clouds – WSJ.com.

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21
Apr

An Economy of Liars

When government and business collude, it’s called crony capitalism. Expect more of this from the financial reforms contemplated in Washington.

By GERALD P. O’DRISCOLL JR.

Free markets depend on truth telling. Prices must reflect the valuations of consumers; interest rates must be reliable guides to entrepreneurs allocating capital across time; and a firm’s accounts must reflect the true value of the business. Rather than truth telling, we are becoming an economy of liars. The cause is straightforward: crony capitalism.

Thomas Carlyle, the 19th century Victorian essayist, unflatteringly described classical liberalism as “anarchy plus a constable.” As a romanticist, Carlyle hated the system—but described it accurately.

Classical liberals, whose modern counterparts are libertarians and small-government conservatives, believed that the state’s duties should be limited (1) to provide for the national defense; (2) to protect persons and property against force and fraud; and (3) to provide public goods that markets cannot. That conception of government and its duties was articulated by the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the U.S. Constitution.

Modern liberals have greatly expanded the list of government functions, but, aside from totalitarian regimes, I know of no modern political movement that has shortened it. While protecting citizens against force, both at home and abroad, is the government’s most basic function, protecting them against fraud is closely allied. By the use of force, a thief takes by arms what is not rightfully his; he who commits fraud takes secretly what is not rightfully his. It is the difference between a robber stealing brazenly on the street and a burglar stealing by stealth at night. The result is the same: the loss of property by its owner and the disordering of civil society. And government has failed miserably to perform this basic function.

Why has this happened? Financial services regulators failed to enforce laws and regulations against fraud. Bernie Madoff is the paradigmatic case and the Securities and Exchange Commission the paradigmatic failed regulator. Fraud is famously difficult to uncover, but as we now know, not Madoff’s. The SEC chose to ignore the evidence brought to its attention. Banking regulators allowed a kind of mortgage dubbed “liar loans” to flourish. And so on.

We have now learned of the creative way Lehman Brothers hid its leverage (how much money it was borrowing) by the use of a Repo 105. The Repo 105 meant Lehman temporarily swapped assets (such as bonds) for cash. A Repo, or repurchasing agreement, is a way to borrow money. But an accounting rule allowed Lehman to book the transaction as a sale and reduce its reported borrowings, according to a report by the court-appointed Lehman bankruptcy examiner, a former federal prosecutor, last month.

Are we to believe that regulators were unaware? Last week Goldman Sachs was accused in a civil fraud suit of deceiving many clients for the benefit of another, hedge-fund operator John Paulson.

The idea that multiplying rules and statutes can protect consumers and investors is surely one of the great intellectual failures of the 20th century. Any static rule will be circumvented or manipulated to evade its application. Better than multiplying rules, financial accounting should be governed by the traditional principle that one has an affirmative duty to present the true condition fairly and accurately—not withstanding what any rule might otherwise allow. And financial institutions should have a duty of care to their customers. Lawyers tell me that would get us closer to the common law approach to fraud and bad dealing.

Public choice theory has identified the root causes of regulatory failure as the capture of regulators by the industry being regulated. Regulatory agencies begin to identify with the interests of the regulated rather than the public they are charged to protect. In a paper for the Federal Reserve’s Jackson Hole Conference in 2008, economist Willem Buiter described “cognitive capture,” by which regulators become incapable of thinking in terms other than that of the industry. On April 5 of this year, The Wall Street Journal chronicled the revolving door between industry and regulator in “Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next.”

Congressional committees overseeing industries succumb to the allure of campaign contributions, the solicitations of industry lobbyists, and the siren song of experts whose livelihood is beholden to the industry. The interests of industry and government become intertwined and it is regulation that binds those interests together. Business succeeds by getting along with politicians and regulators. And vice-versa through the revolving door.

We call that system not the free-market, but crony capitalism. It owes more to Benito Mussolini than to Adam Smith.

Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek described the price system as an information-transmission mechanism. The interplay of producers and consumers establishes prices that reflect relative valuations of goods and services. Subsidies distort prices and lead to misallocation of resources (judged by the preferences of consumers and the opportunity costs of producers). Prices no longer convey true values but distorted ones.

Hayek’s mentor, Ludwig von Mises, predicted in the 1930s that communism would eventually fail because it did not rely on prices to allocate resources. He predicted that the wrong goods would be produced: too many of some, too few of others. He was proven correct.

In the U.S today, we are moving away from reliance on honest pricing. The federal government controls 90% of housing finance. Policies to encourage home ownership remain on the books, and more have been added. Fed policies of low interest rates result in capital being misallocated across time. Low interest rates particularly impact housing because a home is a pre-eminent long-lived asset whose value is enhanced by low interest rates.

Distorted prices and interest rates no longer serve as accurate indicators of the relative importance of goods. Crony capitalism ensures the special access of protected firms and industries to capital. Businesses that stumble in the process of doing what is politically favored are bailed out. That leads to moral hazard and more bailouts in the future. And those losing money may be enabled to hide it by accounting chicanery.

If we want to restore our economic freedom and recover the wonderfully productive free market, we must restore truth-telling on markets. That means the end to price-distorting subsidies, which include artificially low interest rates. No one admits to preferring crony capitalism, but an expansive regulatory state undergirds it in practice.

Piling on more rules and statutes will not produce something different than it has in the past. Reliance on affirmative principles of truth-telling in accounting statements and a duty of care would be preferable. Deregulation is not some kind of libertarian mantra but an absolute necessity if we are to exit crony capitalism.

Mr. O’Driscoll is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He has been a vice president at Citigroup and a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

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19
Apr

New Paddington Bear exhibition opens in Reading (6 pictures)

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Paddington Bear: The Paddington Bear Exhibition at Reading Town  Hall, Reading, Berkshire

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On Christmas Eve 1956, Michael Bond spotted a toy bear in a London shop and ‘felt sorry for it’. He took it home as a present for his wife, and christened it Paddington, after the railway station near which they then lived. ‘For fun,’ he began writing some stories about the furry foundling

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10
Apr

However, it is clear that the economy is having an impact on the aesthetic medicine industry: its the Lipstick Effect in Aesthetic Medicine, a phrase coined by Leonard Lauder, Chairman of Estee Lauder, who saw a huge jump in lipstick sales after September 11th. During times of economic uncertainty, consumers load up on affordable luxuries as a substitute for more expensive items. For physicians in Aesthetic Medicine, the lipstick effect manifests itself in patients choosing laser lipolysis over surgical liposuction or dermal fillers over face lifts.

via The Lipstick Effect in Aesthetic Medicine – 3rd Annual Dubai Congress on Anti-Aging & Aesthetic Medicine, 26-27 October 2010, Dubai, UAE.

09
Apr

Facebook is forbidding its staff from selling privately held shares in the company to prevent insider trading and conflicts of interest as the stock gains in value. Facebook shares are trading at around USD20 on specialist sites such as SecondMarket, suggesting the network is worth around USD17bn.

“Facebook has implemented an insider trading policy to better comply with insider trading laws and to protect the interests of the company and its employees and shareholders,” says the network. Those who break the new rules can be disciplined or fired. However, Facebook has left room within the rules to open a window during which shares could be traded.

via StrategyEye – Industry Intelligence.